The views expressed are those of the speaker(s) and are subject to change. Other teams may hold different views and make different investment decisions. For professional/institutional investors only. Your capital may be at risk.
Fixed income portfolio manager Connor Fitzgerald joins host Amar Reganti to discuss the potential effects of tariffs and other fiscal decisions on the bond market.
2:20 Liberation Day fallout
5:10 Tariffs as taxes
7:40 Breaking down market impacts
10:10 Structural increase in term premia
12:45 Inflation breakeven signals
15:55 Probability of recession
19:00 Managing fixed income portfolios
CONNOR FITZGERALD: If I had to summarize the two challenges that the administration faces today and then why that’s important for the bond market, it’s one that they want to cut spending at the federal government level. They wanna raise revenue via tariffs, but they know that if they do both of those things too aggressively, they risk a recession, and the deficit will expand dramatically in a recession, and it’ll be all for naught.
AMAR REGANTI: Inscribed underneath the statue of Alexander Hamilton at the entrance to the main US Treasury Building in Washington, DC, is the following quote, “He smote the rock of the national resources and abundant streams of revenue gushed forth. He touched the dead corpse of the public credit and it sprung upon its feet.” To most bond market practitioners, modern fixed income really began in the early 1980s. During that time, Paul Volcker, then the chair of the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee, began a plan to crush inflation that had plagued the United States, and thus, perhaps unwittingly, set the stage for a Treasury bull market for the next 40 years. There have, of course, been speed bumps, unexpected rate hikes in the early 1990s, the ballooning deficits of the post-Clinton years, reforms such as a supplementary leverage ratio. And who could forget the events of March of 2020 when the famed basis trade began to unwind? However, in most scenarios, the post-Volcker years have been ones where Treasury remained the flight-to-quality instrument, a symbol of the awesome reserve currency power of the United States. Yet something happened in the week following the “Liberation Day” that makes bond market participants take pause. I’m Amar Reganti, fixed income strategist at Wellington Management, and this is the Investor Exchange, a new podcast focused on asset classes and forces that drive them. I’ll be speaking with some of our foremost fixed income experts about their approaches to these important markets. As always, before we begin, I’d like to thank my colleague Thomas Mucha and his team for letting us use this feed from Wellington’s popular WellSaid podcast. I’m joined by my colleague Connor Fitzgerald, a portfolio manager here at Wellington Management who, rather uniquely, spends his time looking at the relative value between corporate securities and Treasury markets. Connor, welcome.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: Thanks for having me.
AMAR REGANTI: Yeah, so the Hamilton inscription, maybe a little cheesily that I referenced in the beginning, really kind of references the fact that from Hamilton and his… the successors at the Treasury Department, the United States was able to build a sovereign credit market that grew often exponentially and allowed the US government access to pools of capital, that had not existed before that time period. I want to focus obviously on some of the longer-term themes in our markets, but something did make us take pause post-Liberation Day, I guess. I wanted to hear your interpretation of those events and what made them unusual in your mind.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: Sure, so a lot to answer in one question, but let me try to boil it down, at least how I’m trying to break it down in my brain. So, I think what’s unusual is just the sheer size of deficits in the US today. If we go back all the way to the GFC, we had the government, sort of, put the economy on its back, where the government re-levered while the private sector banks were deleveraging. That trend, I would argue, has continued for quite some time where the total leverage in the system has stayed relatively flat, but it’s come down on the corporate side, come down on the household side, but it’s increased massively on the government side of the balance sheet in the economy. And so, I think what the Trump administration is trying to do in a way is balance that equation out because we’re approaching unsustainable levels. You know, anybody can do the math in terms of where deficits will be, if we continue to compound interest expense at the levels we are today. So, I think when you look at Trump’s plan from last fall, the main tool that they have highlighted to generate revenue for themselves is tariffs. I think perhaps one of the things that they underestimated was the impact that tariffs would have on the capital account. What I mean by the capital account is foreign investment into US assets. You know, really up to 2018, we saw a consistent buildup of Treasuries held by foreigners. I think they owned about 50 percent of the government debt market at that point. I think it’s down closer to 30 now because, frankly, they’ve no longer been buying, and we’ve continued to issue. But more importantly, since 2018, we’ve seen a significant amount of -- if you look at our net international investment position, for example, a lot of foreign direct investment, a lot of portfolio equity flows. That’s really where that capital flowing into the US has gone in the past few years. If I had to summarize the two challenges that the administration faces today and then why that’s important for the bond market, it’s one that they want to cut spending at the federal government level. They want to raise revenue via tariffs, but they know that if they do both of those things too aggressively, they risk a recession, and the deficit will expand dramatically in a recession, and it’ll be all for naught. And then on the international side, they can do tariffs and be really aggressive with our various trading partners who we’ve built relationships up with over many, many decades, but they risk the capital account flight on the other side of those tariffs. But if they don’t do tariffs, they don’t have any revenue to pay for tax cuts, and the deficits keep going up. So, I think they’re in quite the pickle in that I think that’s really what the bond market is manic about, is those two dynamics.
AMAR REGANTI: So, there’s something interesting in, I think, what you said there. Traditionally, when you are running deficits that are too high, central government would just raise taxes as a source of revenue. In this case, they’re trying to utilize tariffs, which haven’t been a significant source of revenue in well over a hundred years. But I think we can agree that tariffs are just another form of tax just spread to different parts of the market, right? Like you could argue it’s regressive because if everyone’s buying a piece of cheese that’s coming in from abroad, the piece of cheese doesn’t care if you’re rich or poor, etc. You’re just buying it, while the tax system, while complicated, tends to be built on marginal tax rates. There seems to be, what I would call, incongruity there, right? Where you’re effectively trying to close the deficit with just another form of tax. Am I wrong from your perspective or...?
CONNOR FITZGERALD: I think that’s right. I do think it’s a little bit different than, say, just raising income taxes because I think then, at least, the individual has some choice as to where they can spend their money, and they can choose not to buy one good they can choose to buy or not buy some service, right? So, I do think it’s a little bit different. I do think depending on the product that is coming into the US, I do think the country exporting in here will bear some of the cost. So, I don’t think it’s the exact same thing. But I think an analogy, I made a long time ago, and I believe it was Secretary Bessent may have made a similar analogy in a much more eloquent manner, like, if you rewound 40 years ago where there wasn’t nearly as much income disparity, you also had a situation where somebody who was living in a trailer park in Alabama couldn’t afford to buy a computer, a phone, a GPS tracker. Now, that same person can buy an iPhone that has all those things in it that would’ve cost a million dollars in the ’80s. And so, there’s this question of, do the people that live in the US care about their purchasing power? Do they care about how their income is relative to people around them? And there’s no doubt, the thing that they’re trying to solve for is that the top 1 percent has done better than everyone else because of globalization. I saw an independent research firm put out a piece that just, kind of, walked through simply the whole thing of how like we offshored production, we moved our tax havens to Ireland, and all those benefits accrue to the equity in the S&P 500. And the top 1 percent gets rich and the bottom 90 percent gets left behind. So, I think there’s an open question of if they could pay a little bit more for goods, but they have a good job that’s paying them more money, they might do that trade-off, even if it’s a net-negative economic benefit to them. I think part the base that has supported Trump, sort of retains that belief, and they don’t really care about the top 1 percent’s equity portfolios.
AMAR REGANTI: From a capital market’s perspective, how do you think markets have digested that philosophy I guess, or maybe less about the philosophy, maybe it’s the implementation, maybe it’s both, right? Like in fact, it probably is two pieces here.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: Well, I think the thing, like, to hopefully to try to, like, tie it together really the only deficit we have is “cheap goods.” We actually export services. So like high value add, you know, business and professional services are we’re a significant net exporter of. But we’ve offshored, the building of widgets, right? So, the question is this idea that people aren’t investing in America, like, I’m not sure I agree with that. The data would show me that there’s a lot of foreign direct investment into the US because we’ve been the best economy on the block for quite some time. There’s a lot of portfolio equity inflows. So, I think the market is struggling with, if we really do face off with very aggressive stance to all of our trading partners, what does that mean for the capital account? I do think that that’s part of the reason Treasuries have effectively not helped portfolios in a recession trade in the market. The stock market’s was almost down 20 percent from peak, that’s like a proper correction. Cyclicals have underperformed. We’ve seen decompression in credit spreads with high yield underperforming investment grade. But Treasuries, the long bonds, unchanged in the year, and five-year notes are 35, 40 lower. Like, that’s not that significant of a move, and the Fed has not said anything about cutting. And so, when you think about the push-pull on those dynamics, I think it’s all the things we’re highlighting. They ultimately need to find buyers of Treasuries, and if anything, we seem to be incentivizing people to sell Treasuries. I don’t think the data would support that folks have sold a ton of Treasuries yet, meaning our overseas trading partners but there is- definitely a fear in the market that that could be coming.
AMAR REGANTI: And that you think has, sort of, driven the steepener that we saw, sort of, post-Liberation Day from like tens on out in particular?
CONNOR FITZGERALD: I think that’s a big part of it definitely. I also think the fact that, there’s a lot of people that have said, like, the obvious trade is a lower dollar, right?
AMAR REGANTI: Yeah. I hate it when people say the obvious trade.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: I know, I know, good thing I don’t trade currencies. So I think there’s a whole host of factors, but I also think like if there’s gonna be more volatility, I think you should. I believe in the concept of term premium. Aside from when the Treasury curve was inverted for the historic levels of inversion for the past couple years, we’re still looking at a Treasury curve that’s exceedingly flat versus history. And if I’m gonna be managing assets in as volatile of an environment as we’ve seen in the past couple of weeks, and potentially for the next couple of quarters, I think you should get paid more to own a longer maturity security. Fundamentally, I believe that.
AMAR REGANTI: Okay, so that’s interesting, and I was gonna ask you like, hey, do you think these effects on Treasury markets are short term or long term. But I actually want to package that into your term premia question. To our listeners, for those not intimately involved in bond markets, what term premia is, is the additional premia that a holder of a fixed rate security needs to be paid, in case forward rates rise faster than what’s currently priced in. Additional, kind of, comfort and cushion.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: I just think of it as you should get paid to lock your money up for longer.
AMAR REGANTI: And structurally, let’s say everything reverses next week, right? Like trade war’s over, things go back to normal, tax package, reconciliation goes through. Is that term premia growth or I hate to call it mean reversion, but increase, do you think that’s likely to be a permanent or longer-term feature of Treasury markets?
CONNOR FITZGERALD: I think the increase in term premium is a structural trend that has just gotten going, and I think it will continue. I’m happy to unpack a couple of points there.
AMAR REGANTI: Go ahead.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: One would be, in a perverse way, low yields on long duration securities almost make people have to own them more. So, if you think of a pension or an insurance company when yields go down, their liability duration is lengthened, and they need duration even more. And so, if you look at there are some pensions in the US that probably had a 20-year duration in the middle of 2021 when the long bond was at the lows. That number might be like 12 or 13 now. There’s much less need for strips for long bonds, so that’s one thing. The second thing is I still am a huge believer in the long-term impact of quantitative easing. The Fed, as you know, still owns 30 percent of the Treasury market that’s longer than 10 years. That stock effect, I just think, has had impacts for the past few years, 100 percent believe that. Over time, I believe that as we continue to issue more and more, that supply from the US government, more of it’s getting pushed into coupons, that supply-demand mismatch caused by the stock effect will thaw that supply-demand imbalance and will eventually push 30-year yields higher. But when we were talking about the concept of inflation in late 2021, like if you just took a step back, you’re like, okay, we have monetary and fiscal working in the same direction; that hadn’t happened for a while. Even in Europe, they’re talking about that where it’s like austerity for the first 5, 10 years out of the GFC. You had that happening, you had globalization going the wrong way, you had a shortage of housing. You had greenfield expansion of commodities effectively go to zero. You had all these forces that were obviously pointing towards more inflation. And then there’s a big debate over whether demographics is inflationary or deflationary. I don’t think inflation is gonna be 5 or 6 percent sustainably, but I think it’s unlikely you go to 1 or 2. I think all those forces are still in play. Like, we’re in a structural uptrend, and I think the front end of the Treasury curve doesn’t look that mispriced to me. It’s more the long end of the treasury curve --
AMAR REGANTI: Yeah --
CONNOR FITZGERALD: -- that I think --
AMAR REGANTI: -- it’s interesting --
CONNOR FITZGERALD: -- stands out.
AMAR REGANTI: Take breakevens, at least in the front end, reflect a bit more of an inflationary period. But if you’ve got like five years, even longer, you’re looking at 230-ish.
AMAR REGANTI: Nothing surprising, kind of, given probably closer to where spot trend inflation is. Do you expect that to be wider, or do you need that to be wider?
CONNOR FITZGERALD: I’m glad you brought that up because I definitely wanted to talk about that. So we had a conversation on email with a large group of folks this past week and about, like, real rates at 3 percent. That’s where they were in the GFC, I believe, but that was more because inflation went negative and the inflation break-even market went negative … is pricing in deflation, a little bit different situation today. But the concept of deficits and crowding out is really simple. As the government issues more and more debt, you need to attract more and more capital to fund that. Without knowing where real yields are and what they were historically, all else equal, I would say ever-expanding deficits should equal higher and higher real yields. And if I think about a 3 percent real yield, and I think we should explain, like a simple explanation of what this is doing.
AMAR REGANTI: If you decompose a regular Treasury bond, it’s primarily composed of two things. Primarily. The first is the inflation breakeven, which is really the way the market measures it, is the differential between the TIPS bond real yield and the nominal Treasury security. So, that difference is supposed to be the market’s best guess of where inflation is likely to be at that point over given periods of time. When you take out the inflation component, and, the caveat is you cancel out a whole bunch of other factors, what you have left is the real yield, which is supposed to be effectively the long-term real growth in GDP of the broader economy. That’s what it’s supposed to reflect. It doesn’t always reflect that, it can be other things, but that is what, in a textbook, it should reflect.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: But to your point, if the borrowing rate in the economy is significantly higher than the natural rate of growth, then that will slow growth in the economy. And if you have the borrowing rate below the natural rate of rate of growth, that’s stimulative, right?
AMAR REGANTI: Yeah.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: I would almost argue that we’re just back to like normal levels.
AMAR REGANTI: Of borrowing rates, yeah.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: A 3 percent real yield, if we think the US economy can grow 2.5 percent to 3 percent, 3 is probably a little high, that’s not super restrictive to me. And then I lay over this idea of ever-expanding deficits and somebody needs to buy the bonds, which is likely US households because the Fed’s no longer buying bonds. I don’t know, it’s okay, but it’s not like a screaming buy to me. Because a 3 percent real yield effectively implies, if you think inflation’s 3 percent for the next 30 years, you’re locking in a 6 percent nominal return. That’s good. You know, the long-term equity return is seven or eight, but I don’t know that it’s something that everybody’s gonna be like, “I have to own that today”
AMAR REGANTI: I think before there was this flight-to-quality, sort of, perspective that you’d almost be like, “I’m willing to pay to have this sort of offsetting, you know factor in my portfolio.”
CONNOR FITZGERALD: Which is another great point. So there’s a lot of portfolios that are balanced portfolios where they have a fixed income component, and they have an equity component, and interest rates and Treasury bonds are often, sort of, the diversifier versus the risky side of the ledger, right? And we are having conversations around, like, will they work as they have in the past and as we intended them to? That kind of changes how a lot of folks in the market will approach portfolio construction. Managing in this type of environment is very different than certainly the 2010 to 2020 period, and that’s something we’re spending a lot of time thinking about.
AMAR REGANTI: Broader economy, recession, where do you come out on that?
CONNOR FITZGERALD: Sadly, I come out with a pretty high probability of a recession.
AMAR REGANTI: Okay.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: I don’t think that it’s gonna be a cataclysmic recession, where we need to build bunkers inside hills --
AMAR REGANTI: Though I will say I like the quote of, “It’s a recession when your neighbor loses their job, it’s a depression when you lose your job,”
CONNOR FITZGERALD: Sure. But, I think coming into this year, the economy was potentially a little weaker than folks thought or appreciated. And I would describe it more as, the level of prices, like the cumulative amount of inflation that we have experienced since late 2021, people have been, sort of tolerating it and continuing to spend at the same pace. People talk about this concept of excess savings, right? I just think we’re at the point where people are like, I just can’t pay 500 dollars for a ski ticket, right? And then propagate that through the economy with hotel prices and the price of a flight to Florida, whatever it is like --
AMAR REGANTI: And this is pre-Liberation Day kind of stuff?
CONNOR FITZGERALD: This is just the US economy pre-Trump even getting elected. I think the economy, I think it’s okay, but I don’t think we were growing gangbusters. But then I think the market got really excited about this idea that deregulation and tax cuts could give us another leg up. One of my favorite comments recently is like when was the last time you heard a politician say no pain, no gain? Every politician that we’ve lived with for the past 10 to 15 years has been focused on the two- to four-year outlook to get reelected, and I don’t take saying that lightly, I just think that’s, kind of, the game, right? They seem to be willing to tolerate a transition period as they’ve called it. And the stock market definitely; this is consensus-ish now, but I don’t think the stock market’s their barometer for success at this point. So, I think there’s a good chance of a recession. I don’t think it’s gonna be like a, you know, bank deleveraging, credit crunch disaster. I just think that if I think about my whole career, we’ve never really had a normal recession. We had the GFC in the first two years of my career, and then since then we’ve had these one-off shocks that we had. And this is a super important point, I think, epic amount of policy space in either monetary or fiscal, the two most important pillars of policy support. I think we’re at the end of the line. I don’t think we can do more fiscal, and I don’t think we can do more monetary. I think the Fed can cut rates, but I don’t think they can go to zero and start doin’ QE. I think there would need to be something pretty bad for them to fire that bullet.
AMAR REGANTI: Yeah, again, that put us much farther away from where we’re currently operating at.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: Because I think it would be, sort of, an admission that we need the Fed to fund the Treasury market.
AMAR REGANTI: I mean, that’s not the craziest admission, I think, first of all. And then I think that’s its own other episode at some point.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: The last thing I’d say in the recession, the reason I don’t think it will be that bad is corporate and household balance sheets are really strong. Any way you cut it, they really are. The low-end consumer is facing challenges, and definitionally, that’s why they’re the low-end consumer. But I think even relative to themselves, if you look at different quintiles of income and wealth, they’re in better shape than they were going into prior recessions.
AMAR REGANTI: Okay, understood. So, that means like it’s certainly not what you call crisis-level recessions --
CONNOR FITZGERALD: Correct.
AMAR REGANTI: -- but one that while unpleasant, and maybe we don’t know the length of it, isn’t as deep as the ones we’ve faced in the last several years?
CONNOR FITZGERALD: Correct.
AMAR REGANTI: So, how do you think about fixed income portfolio management going into something like this? And given everything you just said about the Treasury market, too?
CONNOR FITZGERALD: First, I think this concept of duration as a hedge, I think duration won’t work as well as you think hedging portfolios. So if you thought you needed, you know, two years of duration to hedge your portfolio in five-year notes, that might be four years on a forward-looking basis. It’s gonna be different than what the model says looking backward. The second thing is high conviction in a steeper Treasury curve in almost any outcome, you know, in the outcome where everything’s fine and Trump gets his tax plan through, I think the long end of the Treasury curve will sell off potentially aggressively.
AMAR REGANTI: And that’s the base case right now, it’s very likely that the votes are there to get the extension of the tax cuts.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: So, I think that presents a risk in the long end. I think with the repricing in credit spreads and how high yields are, I do think there’s some value in certain parts of high yield. There’s parts of high yield now that are yielding 8 to 9 percent where, you know, they’re not without risk, and they’ll be penalized in a recession, but 8 to 9 percent is pretty chunky yields. That’s hard to lose money on, if you’re picking companies that don’t default over a two-, three-year horizon.
AMAR REGANTI: Especially if you’re not expecting the violent sort of default cycle that we might have expected in levered recessions.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: Correct, and also to be a bit of a contrarian, like the stuff we’re talking about, all the CEOs and CFOs are talking about, too. I don’t think anybody’s taking a ton of risk with their balance sheet right now. If anything, people are probably having conversations of how do we extend our option? And I think liquidity would be the final point I would make for companies, but also for portfolio management, capital and liquidity in the portfolio is king right now. Because I think we’re gonna have opportunities to deploy it at attractive levels in the coming 6 to 12 months. And I just think if you want to survive a challenging period, you’ve gotta have liquidity, and you gotta be able to stay in the game.
AMAR REGANTI: Yeah, I mean, it is interesting about that liquidity point. While risk markets are down, the hard data still hasn’t actually come in yet.
CONNOR FITZGERALD: A hundred percent.
AMAR REGANTI: Ok well, I think this was a great conversation, and I’m thrilled you were able to do this. Thanks, I know it’s a busy time. Once again, Connor Fitzgerald, a portfolio manager here at Wellington Management. Connor, thanks for joining us here today.
Views expressed are those of the speaker(s) and are subject to change. Other teams may hold different views and make different investment decisions. For professional/institutional investors only. Your capital may be at risk. Podcast produced May 2025.
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